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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DARWIN W. LARSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
VALLENE P. LARSEN, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is the second time an appeal has been taken by 
appellant in ths matter. 
The principal points urged upon appellant's first 
appeal were, one: That estoppal was a good defense for 
alleged delinquent child support under the facts of this 
case and, two: That if a third party voluntarily and with-
out any thought of reimbursement from the natural 
father adequately supported the child that no recovery 
can be had against the divorced husband by the divorced 
wife. 
This Court in its decision rendered July 31, 1956, 
Raid that estoppal was a good defense if proven and 2: 
That if a third party (The defendant's second husband 
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in this case) adequately and voluntarily supported the 
child that it was also a good defense to any action by 
the divorced wife for alleged back support money. On 
these two questions the Court said: 
' 'So in this case if the trial court finds from the 
evidence that appellant would not have left his job and 
gone on a mission for his church but for such represen-
tations that she would not require him to pay such in-
stallments if he would just leave her and the child alone, 
and that the appelant in reliance upon her representa-
tions complied with her request and that thereafter she 
supported the child and if such payments are collected 
from him she wll be entitled to them for her own use and 
benefit, and that it would be a great hardship on him to 
now force hirn to make such payments, she would now be 
estopped from forcing him to pay such past due install-
ments as accrued during the time he was filling such mis-
sion. 
If the child has been the beneficiary of equivalent 
support and education so that the mother is entitled to 
receive all of said past due support rnoney, she should 
be free to release, cmnprmnise or waive that which is 
hers. But if the child has been provided bare shelter and 
food, and denied the benefit of proper clothes and dental 
and rnedical care, then the n1other should not be free 
to waive that portion of past due support n1oney that 
the child has not received. The authorities cited above 
hold that this doctrine is applicable to this extent. It is 
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the prerogative of the trial court to determine these facts 
and if he finds that facts exist to justify equitable es-
toppel, he should apply that doctrine and relieve the 
father from payment of the installnwnts to the extent 
indica ted. ' ' 
This Court then reversed the lower court's judgment 
and sent the cause back for the trial court to find on 
these two questions only and no others. 
The lower court in making its findings found ''that 
from the month of June 1947, to and including the 31st 
day of December 1950, the plaintiff is relieved of payment 
of said support money for the reason that defendant's 
present husband adequately and voluntarily supported 
said child without any thought of reimbursen1ent. '' The 
lower court further found, Quote, ''That for a period 
of 28 months, beginning in February 1947, plaintiff 
served on a foreign mission for the L. D. S. Church, and 
for the period from June 1947, until the end of his mis-
sion the defendant had promised the plaintiff to waive 
support money for their child, and plaintiff, relying on 
such representations, went on said mission, changing 
his financial position, which he would not have done 
except for such representations.'' (When the Court men-
tions February 1947, we are sure the Court means Feb-
ruary 1948.) Trans. Supplement 14. 
Tt will he noted from these findings that thP lower 
court not only found payment by a third party, but estop-
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pel for the period between February 1948 and the time 
appellant came hmne from his 1nission, but also found 
that from June 1947 to December 1947 that a third 
party (Mr. DeCarlo, defendant's second husband) sup-
ported voluntarily and without thought of reimburae-
ment. 
It will be further noted that the court below did not 
nmke an express finding on the question of estoppel or 
whether a third party (Mr. DeCaro) did voluntarily 
or involuntarily support said child after appellant came 
home from his mission, but the court did make a finding 
that since the plaintiff came home from his mission and 
for a period of 30 months thereafter he drew from the 
Veterans Administration $30.00 per month upon his 
representation that he had a dependent and that plain-
tiff converted the san1e to his own use. The Court then 
found that defendant was entitled to judgement against 
plaintiff in the sum of $1890.00 together with interest in 
the sum of $835.36, making a total of $2725.36 and there-
after entered judgment against plaintiff in the total 
sum of $2725.36 and in favor of defendant. (Trans. Supp. 
18) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Statement of Points upon which Appellant Relies 
for Reversal of J udg1nent and Decree. 
l. The Court erred in failing to find under the in-
structions of the Supre1ne Court on whether a third par-
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tr (:M.r. DeCaro) from the time appellant came home 
from his 1nission and to the tiine respondent requested 
and received resu1nption of monthly support 1noney and 
in failing to find that the support money contributed by 
respondent's second husband was voluntary and without 
an:r thought of reimbursement from appellant. 
2. The Court erred in finding outside of the Supreme 
Courts instructions, to-wit: The Court found that ap-
pellant applied for and received $30.00 per month for a 
period of 30 months after coming home from his mission 
and that he converted the same to his own use. 
3.The Court erred in finding (assuming for pur-
poses of argtunent only that above points are not wel1 
taken) that there was any interest due or owing respon-
dent from appellant. 
4. The Court erred 111 finding that said child of 
parties is in need of dental care costing approximately 
$1000.00 for the reason that it is an immaterial finding 
and if material there is no evidence that such need ac-
crued during the alleged delinquency period or that the 
said child was not adequately cared for during aaid 
period, and that finding it too indefinite. 
5. The Court erred in its conlusion of law that de-
fendant is entitled to judgment against plaintiff in the 
sum of $2725.36 or any sum whatsoever. 
G. rl,he Court erred in awarding judgment against 
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the plaintiff in the sum of $2725.36 or any sum whatso-
ever. 
ARGUMENT, Point 1 and 2 
POINT No. 1. The Court erred in failing to find 
under the instructions of the Supreme Court on whether 
a third party (Mr. DeCaro) from the time appellant 
came home from his Inission and to the time respondent 
requested and received resumption of monthly support 
1noney and in failing to find that the support money 
contributed by respondent's second husband was volun-
tary and without any thought of reimbursmnent from 
appellant. 
POINT No. 2 The Court erred in finding outside of 
the Suprmne Courts instructions, to-wit: The Court 
found that appellant applied for and received $30.00 per 
month for a period of 30 Inonths after con1ing home from 
his mission and that he converted the san1e to his own 
use and makes this the basis of its conclusions and 
judgment. 
This Court in reversing the lo·wer court in appel-
lant's first appeal said, that· if the child had been ade-
quately and voluntarily cared for by a third party then 
the 1nother could release, cmnprmnise or waive that 
which was hers. 
There is no evedence in the whole record ·which 
shows that during the tilne 'In' are now considering the 
(·IJild was i11adequately eared for and if that be so then 
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the mother is entitled to no recovery against plaintiff. 
In connection with this state1nent it will be noted that 
the trial court found its findngs of fact that respon-
dent's second husband took adequate care of said child 
from June 1947 to and including the month of December, 
1950, which was the time appellant came home from his 
mission. And the evdence as far as we have been able to 
discern is the same fron1 December 1950 to and including 
the 30 n1onths that said appellant was at school and re-
ceiving $30.00 a month from the Veterans Administration 
because he had the child as a legal dependent. This being 
true how can the trial court say that for this period the 
respondent is entitled to judgment~ We long since 
learned that "things equal to the same thing are equal 
to each other." The fact that appellant received $30.00 
per month because he had a legal dependent is outside 
of the opinion of this Court as therein expressed and is 
utterly immaterial, incompetent and irrelevant for any 
branch of this case. One more word on this subject of 
appellant allegedly converting this money to his own 
use. It will be observed from copy of letter dated Aug-
ust 7, 1956 and reply of Veterans Administration pp. 6 
and 7 of Transcript Supplement that Appellant was en-
titled to this money on the ground that child was a legal 
dependant and not on the ground for the reason that he 
was actually supporting her. There is no evidence in the 
whole record nor can it he had to show the contrary 
under the facts o£ this case. There is also the added 
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evidence adduced at the second hearing that respondent's 
second husband applied for and received money from the 
government for support of said child (Transcript Sup-
plement pp. 8-9) 
ARGUMENT - POINT THREE 
The Court erred in finding (assuming for purpose 
of argument only that above points are not well taken) 
that there was any interest due or owing respondent from 
appellant. 
Assuming for the purpose of argument only that 
appellant is subject to payment of the principal, we be-
lieve it may be properly contended that in as much as 
no demand for payment during the time under considera-
tion was ever made, and the further fact that the ap-
pellant was never permitted to see the child added to the 
further fact that respondent told him in both conversa-
tion and by letter she did not want any n1oney (Tr. 246 
and exhibit 19 a letter written in Jan. 1951 after he came 
horne from his mission). Also there is good authorit~~ 
to the effect that before interest can be had a demand 
must first be made to pay the principal. . : There is no 
demand shown in the whole transcript. 33 C. J. page 233 
section 123. 
ARGUMENT - POINT FOUR 
The Court erred in finding that said child of 
parties i~ in need of dental care costing approxhnately 
$1000.00 for the reat:'on that it i~ an innuaterial finding 
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and if material there is no evidence that such need ac-
crued during the alleged delinquency period or that the 
said ehild was not adequately cared for during said 
period, and that finding is too indefinite. 
The Court below in its finding (Tran. Supp. 14-15) 
found ''that the child is in need of dental care costing 
approximately $1000.00''. 
If the court below intends that this finding should 
show that the care received by the child from the second 
husband was inadequate it does not so do as we have been 
unable to find any evidence which shows that this in-
adequacy accrued when appellant was not paying the 
alleged support money. And if this is so, no proper 
inadequacy of support can be shown and a judgment 
cannot be supported. Nor is there a finding showing in-
adequey of voluntary support during any of the time 
under consideration. 
Also the court in its finding makes no definite find-
ing as to the rnoney needed for dental care but as pointed 
out uses the word "approximately $1000 00. We believe 
it is elementary that a definite sum must be found or it 
will not aid to -support a judgment. 
Then too, the finding here complained of goes out-
side of the opinion of this Court and is then--fore of no 
effect. 
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ARGUl\IENT- POINTS 5 and 6 
5. The Court erred in its conclusion of law that de-
fendant is entitled to judgement against plaintiff in 
the sum of 2725.36 or any sum whatsoever. 
6. The Court erred in awarding judgment against 
the plaintiff in the sum of $2725.36, or any sum whatso-
ever. 
As these two points are closely allied we take them 
together in argument. 
All we have said in support of points 1, 2, 3, and 4 we 
reiterate and incorporate here for it is applicable to point 
5 and6 for it follows that if these points or any of them 
are well taken, then it is true that the findings, conclu-
sions and judgment that is adverse to the appellant 
should not have been made and the case should have been 
dismissed. But in as much as it was not we ask that the 
judgment be set aside and the cause dis1nissed. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the appellant urges this Court to dis-
allow the judgment herein entered against the appellant 
and in favor of respondent, and dis1niss the matter. 
It n1ay be that the 1nen1bers of this Court 1nay desire 
to refresh their recollections on son1e points in this case. 
If that be so then the briefs written by respective coun-
sel on the former appeal is hereby incorporated and made 
part of this appeal. 
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An added word: vVhen the respondent called appel-
lant'~ attention to the fact that their child needed a re-
placement of two front teeth the appellant agreed to pay 
for the same even though this need did not arise until 
after he had resu1ned payments, when she requested the 
same. He is still willing to do this even though he has to 
borrow the Inoney, but he resists any judgement against 
him. 
Hespectively submitted, 
Harvey A. Sjostrom, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
375 West Center Street, 
Logan, Utah 
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